The US policy mistakes that led to a chaotic retreat from Afghanistan were only surpassed by Pakistan’s mistake in championing the Taliban and the much more dangerous Haqqani group. The Haqqanis are currently holding Afghanistan hostage. So far the regional powers are still trying to fight the Taliban, but for how long?
The memories of August 2021 are still fresh. Refugees falling from a C-17 transport plane and lining up in sewage will remain the enduring images of the drone attack on an innocent family and billions of dollars in equipment. military was left behind. But what is the local situation like now?
Almost a year later, a CIA operation killed Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of Al Qa’ida, who was said to be staying at a house linked to Sirajuddin Haqqani in the Sherpur district of Kabul. This single fact points to three important points.
- Terrorists hiding in Waziristan on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border have returned to Afghanistan for the first time since late 2001. This is exactly what Western leaders claim will happen as they justify their defense. NATO presence for 20 years. The United Nations recently reported that the Islamic State (IS) branch in Afghanistan is one of the “strongest and best-established organizations” in its regional networks.
- The Haqqanis, who have long been close to leader Al Qa’ida, have not changed their views. They lead a terrorist organization that is both distinct from and part of the Taliban. They are (or should be) the biggest hurdle for countries considering discussing recognition with the traditional Kandahari Taliban, led by the more moderate Mullah Baradar.
- While CIA drones could clearly conduct an operation in Kabul, the fact remains that the West’s Counterterrorism capabilities in Afghanistan are inadequate given the magnitude of the threat. Zawahiri is more of a symbolic target than a major risk, and the US operation must operate within the limits of its capabilities.
The removal of the Haqqanis from Afghanistan is an ambition that would unite most of the major powers in the region as well as the Kandaharis. However, it is difficult to see how that can happen even if Pakistani support can be guaranteed. The Haqqanis control Kabul, are heavily armed and intend to stay.
Indeed the events of the past year have been a disaster for Pakistan. Within weeks of the Taliban takeover, Islamabad had good reason to realize how wrong it was to support them. Pakistan has three goals that it wants the Taliban to accomplish.
- To keep the Indians out of Afghanistan. But India, instead of funding the Taliban’s opponents, decided to go to war with Kabul. New Delhi has provided Food aid to a country with real need. It also played subtly based on the traditional Pakistani dislike of the Kandahari Taliban. Mullah Yaqub, the Taliban Defense Minister, even suggested military training in India.
- The Taliban and Haqqanis are expected to facilitate the destruction of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and the handover of wanted terrorists to the Pakistani army. The Haqqanis soon made it clear that they would not be able to comply. They argued that Kandaharis was often in the same village as the TTP and was preventing cooperation. Instead, the Pakistani military had to participate in the ceasefire negotiations with TTP.
- The new government of Afghanistan is said to have recognized the Durand Line in 1897 as an international border. Pakistan had erected wire fences at considerable expense in recent years but within weeks the Taliban and TTP had cut the wire and request extension to the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.
It seems that Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff, General Qamar Bajwa, was worried about a Taliban takeover but he was opposed by Intelligence Director Faiz Hamid and the powerful Army Corps Commanders. China also expressed concern about Islamabad’s support for a Taliban-only government (instead of a broader government) but Beijing is not pushing its case.
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Now, a year on, China is worried. The Taliban and Haqqanis have shown no interest in handing over Uighur fighters to Chinese authorities. There are concerns in Beijing that Uighur extremists may have begun collaborating with Balochi and TTP groups to destroy Pakistan China Economic Corridor (CPEC). There have been a number of attacks inside Pakistan in which the Chinese have been targeted, including the April 2021 bombing of Quetta, which the Chinese Ambassador nearly missed. escape. A year later, a suicide bomber in Balochi killed three Chinese citizens near Karachi’s Confucius Institute. This has led to an extension in the face of Chinese pressure to deploy Guard to Pakistan; a request that Pakistan has repeatedly refused.
Iran is another country that has sought to engage with the Taliban. Their embassy in Kabul remains open and they are watching carefully to see how the Taliban treat the large Shia minority in the country. Like China, it is relieved to see NATO’s backing and, like India, it seems now has decided not to support the armed opposition group Ahmed Massoud operating close to the Tajik border. No country wants to extend the civil war in Afghanistan yet.
That includes Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) still looking to Moscow on Afghanistan policy as part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). League. Russia established direct contact with the Taliban in 2017 but remains extremely suspicious of the Taliban’s intentions and concerned about the northward spread of weapons, religious extremism, terrorism and opium as well as their ability to destabilize CAR. Meanwhile, all the plans for the pipeline and railway across Afghanistan depends on the recognition of the Taliban by the international community and for peace.
And therein lies the conundrum. The West should not recognize Afghanistan while the Haqqanis control Kabul and will not while the Taliban refuse to allow female high school students. Until recognition, nothing can progress but humanitarian aid. In the meantime, what the international community (now with more pressing concerns) can do is try to prevent terrorism and drugs from being exported from Afghanistan. The same policy failed from 1989 to 2001 and is sure to fail again.
This work was first published by our friends at RUSI.
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