The concept of strategic ambiguity has its advantages but also its dangers. That means an American President may have only a few hours to decide whether to go to war with China or abandon Taiwan. The United States should develop a more calibrated range of options to allow Beijing to better understand the risks of interference.
EXPERT TESTING – President Joe Biden told CBS News that the US military would fight China if Taiwan was invaded. This goes further than similar statements in May 2022 and October 2021, and on all three occasions the White House “backtracked” the comments and asserted that US policy remained unchanged. change. There can be little doubt, however, that the three statements (and “step back”) were choreographed to warn China of the consequences of an invasion of Taiwan without completely abandoning “strategic ambiguity.” ” to move to “strategic clarity”.
A good example of “strategic clarity” is China’s position on Taiwan. Taiwan will be reunited with China; no ifs, no buts. The only uncertainties surround time and method. 2035 and 2049 have been suggested as possible dates (the centenary of the Communist Party of China and the People’s Republic of China) but could be much earlier.
By contrast, “strategic ambiguity” means that China must keep guessing whether the United States will respond to an invasion of Taiwan. The theory is that ambiguity acts as a deterrent. But it no?
There are four problems with “strategic ambiguity”. The first is that it often masks a real uncertainty in the policy owner (the US) whether it will act to protect potential victims and whether that defense includes intervention. direct military, arms supply and intelligence or not.
The second is that its very existence can be an obstacle to real policymaking. An incoming Foreign Minister will be told “our policy towards Taiwan is one of strategic ambiguity” and the meeting then moves on to the next topic. In other words, it looks like a policy, but, unless underpinned by adequate assessment and planning, it is a void.
Third, potential aggressors are increasingly wise to understand that “strategic ambiguity” often means “no policy.” In such cases, the blocking effect disappears.
And the fourth thing is, in the time of truth, the President will have to make a hasty decision that may cover a host of other factors such as the state of the global economy and his own election prospects. or she.
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Of course, there is a big advantage in “strategic ambiguity”. It does not lock a country by treaty or guarantee entry into a war against its wishes. There are some who wish Britain didn’t have to rely on Belgium for help in 1914 thanks to the distant 1839. Treaty of London; and many others regretted giving aid to Poland in 1939, in honor of a verbal commitment by Neville Chamberlain just six months earlier.
Those who formulated the 1994 Belgrade Memorandum gave Ukraine “assurance” rather than a reassurance when Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons. The guarantee has no legal obligation and is proven null and void when Putin Invasion of Crimea in 2014.
In the case of Taiwan, the second benefit is “strategic ambiguity”. It is also used by the United States as a lever against Taiwan to ensure that the island does not take undue provocations, such as declaring independence from China. George W. Bush made this clear in 2003, when he feared that former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian was at risk. irresponsibly speaking on this subject.
However, “strategic ambiguity” did not work in the case of Ukraine. President Biden sabotaged it himself when he made it clear that the United States would not intervene militarily if President Putin aggression. At the time, however, Putin concluded, after the fall of Afghanistan in August 2021, that Biden was incapable of sending American forces into another war.
Realizing that his foreign policy risks causing another setback in Taiwan, Biden made the first sentence of his three statements seem to contradict “strategic ambiguity.” It is said that such an important policy needs such a rough treatment of adhesive plaster. It demonstrates that a policy that appears measured and proportional at first glance is actually very risky. It inevitably leads to hasty decisions with a very binary outcome. At the most basic level, Biden will have to decide whether to order an American submarine in the Taiwan Strait to sink the Chinese landing craft. One decision could lead to a great war; the other could lead to Taiwan’s demise as a democracy (not to mention China’s loss of the world’s most important advanced chip maker).
One approach would be to reinforce the “strategic ambiguity” with a clearer statement that the only acceptable way to “reunify” Taiwan would be by a free and open referendum. justice of the people of Taiwan without any outside pressure and outlines the consequences of any coercive action against Taiwan. These need to go beyond economic sanctions, which Beijing expects (and predicts to diminish over time). After all, China suffered minimally from the strangulation of the Hong Kong democracy movement despite the obligations set forth in the 1997 Basic Law.
China can be told that any attempt to blockade the island or threaten Taiwan with aggression will result in the US (and the West) having to review all agreed measures. from the 1970s with the original aim of luring Beijing out of its alliance with the Soviet Union. and then bringing China into the global economy. This would introduce serious “devaluation risks” into China’s Taiwan policy. Beijing can expect not only sanctions but also a reassessment of its WTO membership, reassessment of its claims to Tibet and the Aksai Chin region in the Himalayas, closer scrutiny of Xinjiang, more opposition to its activities in the South China Sea, and ultimately a complete reassessment of the One China policy.
China is so deeply embedded in the global economy (unlike Russia) that the Communist Party and its leadership cannot afford to face a major crisis with the United States and the West. “Strategic ambiguity” encourages the leadership to think that they can avoid a war with the United States with a quick and successful invasion of Taiwan. Biden’s recent statements are intended to dissuade Mr. Xi from making that choice, but there is still scope for more clarity on the consequences.
This work was first published by our friends at RUSI.
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